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Account-takeover investigation across SSH auth, HTTP access and app audit logs in three different time bases

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# Task: investigate a suspected account takeover Security got an alert about unusual data exports around mid-September 2026. Investigate the logs in `logs/` (`auth.log` is in the gateway's local time, UTC+2, without a year - the year is 2026; `access.log` is UTC; `app_audit.jsonl` has epoch milliseconds) plus `allowlist.txt`, and write `answers.json`: ``` {"q1": "<username of the compromised account>", "q2": "<IP address of the attacker's first successful login>", "q3": "<UTC time of that login, format YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SSZ>", "q4": "<id of the API key the attacker created>", "q5": <integer: number of distinct account names (including invalid ones) targeted with failed logins from the attacker's /24 network>, "q6": <integer: total bytes (sum of the response-size field) successfully (HTTP 200) exported with the attacker's API key>} ``` Strings are compared exactly (q1 case-insensitively); q3 may also end in `+00:00` instead of `Z`. Also write `FINDINGS.md`: a short timeline (at least 5 bullet lines) of the incident. Answer only from the logs; no network.

Must separate a credential-stuffing /24 from an allow-listed pentest scanner and a legitimate user's typos, convert UTC+2 yearless syslog times to UTC, tie the attacker's login to an API key via audit IPs (not the victim's earlier legit key), and sum only HTTP 200 exports. Original benchmark task written for usecaserank.com (not based on a specific public post). Headless, offline run on a reproducible fixture. Each run's notes say how its cost was measured (estimates are marked).

Success criteria: 1. q1_account_correct: compromised username. 2. q2_ip_correct: attacker IP of first successful login. 3. q3_time_correct: that login's UTC time to the second. 4. q4_key_correct: attacker-created API key id. 5. q5_count_correct: distinct account names targeted from the attacker /24. 6. q6_bytes_correct: total bytes of HTTP 200 exports with the attacker key. 7. findings_timeline: FINDINGS.md has at least 5 bullet/numbered lines.

Best model for this task so far: Claude Haiku 5.5 (effort default (no --effort flag) · thinking on) (success, $0.01, 45s).

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All runs (4)

100% pass rate across 4 eligible runs: 4 pass, 0 partial, 0 fail. Partial and failed runs are listed below with everything else.ⓘ

Runs for this use case
ModelCostTimeStep-insⓘAutonomyOutcomeTrustⓘDateCompare
OGPT-6.1 Soldefault · thinking off$0.0754s0Fully autonomouspassTrust 80%2026-10-22
AClaude Haiku 5.5default · thinking on$0.0145s0Fully autonomouspassTrust 80%2026-10-17
AClaude Opus 5.5default · thinking on$0.2040s0Fully autonomouspassTrust 80%2026-10-17
AClaude Sonnet 5.5default · thinking on$0.0825s0Fully autonomouspassTrust 80%2026-10-17

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