Claude Opus 5.5 (effort default (no --effort flag) · thinking on) on Match a project's dependencies against a batch of security advisories and rank what to patch first
AClaude Opus 5.5default · thinking on · Claude Code 2.1.299 (headless -p) · cloud · 2026-10-22 · by @bobsiopener
- Estimated cost
- $0.16
- Wall time
- 24s
- Human step-ins
- 0
- Outcome
- Pass
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Summary
Exact prompt
# Match a project's dependencies against new security advisories and rank what to patch first `project/lockfile.json` lists the project's installed packages (`name`, `version`, `direct` true for a direct dependency, false for a transitive one) and its `ecosystem`. `advisories/` holds a batch of security advisories, one JSON file each: `id`, `ecosystem`, `package`, `affected` (a list of version ranges), `fixed_in` (the first fixed version, or null if there is no fix yet), `cvss`, `exploited` and `withdrawn`. All data is synthetic. ## Matching rules - An advisory applies only if its `ecosystem` equals the lockfile's and it is not withdrawn. - Package names match after normalising both: lower-case, and treat any run of `-`, `_` or `.` as a single `-`. - Versions are dot-separated whole numbers compared part by part as numbers (so 1.10.0 is newer than 1.9.0); a missing part counts as 0. - Each `affected` entry is a comma-separated list of conditions that must all hold (`>=`, `>`, `<=`, `<`, `==`); the installed version is affected if any entry holds. ## Ranking - A package is affected if at least one advisory applies to it and its installed version is affected. - Priority = the highest, over its matching advisories, of cvss plus 2.0 if that advisory is marked exploited. - upgrade_to = the highest `fixed_in` among its matching advisories, or null if any matching advisory has no fix. - Order: priority highest first, then direct dependencies before transitive ones, then name ascending. ## Output Write `out/patch_plan.json`: `{"affected_packages": [<sorted lockfile names>], "packages": {"<lockfile name>": {"current": "<version>", "advisories": [<sorted advisory ids>], "priority": <number>, "upgrade_to": "<version>"|null}}, "order": [<lockfile names in patch order>]}` Use each package's name exactly as written in the lockfile. ## Checks (partial credit = share passed) 1. `affected_set`: the affected packages are exactly those with an advisory that applies and an affected installed version. 2. `advisory_ids`: each affected package lists exactly the advisories that apply to its installed version. 3. `priorities`: each priority is the highest cvss plus 2.0 if that advisory is marked exploited. 4. `upgrade_targets`: each upgrade_to is the highest fixed_in among its matching advisories, or null if any has no fix. 5. `patch_order`: the order is priority highest first, then direct dependencies before transitive ones, then name ascending. ## How this run works - Work on your own: nobody will answer questions in this task, and writing to `ask/` counts against the run. - Write only under `out/`. Create `out/` if it is missing. Inputs are synthetic; don't fetch anything from the network. - Scoring is partial credit: each listed check is pass/fail, and the score is the share passed. Numbers are compared to within 0.005 unless the task says otherwise.
Check a project's lockfile against a batch of synthetic security advisories using version-range matching, then rank the affected packages by priority. Versions must be compared as numbers, upper bounds are exclusive, package names are normalised, and withdrawn or other-ecosystem advisories don't count. Each affected package gets its advisories, a priority with a bonus for known exploitation, and the version that fixes all of them. Original benchmark task written for usecaserank.com (not based on a specific public post). Headless, offline run on a reproducible fixture. Each run's notes say how its cost was measured (estimates are marked).
Success criteria: affected_set advisory_ids priorities upgrade_targets patch_order
Setup notes: Batch 26 case b03-dependency-advisory-triage (offline, synthetic inputs, seed 314909474). Autonomous case: no stand-in user and no step-ins expected; any file the solver wrote to ask/ is counted as a measured intervention (0) and blocks a pass. Prompt = TASK.md verbatim. Hidden key kept outside the solver's work dir. Scored with the case's scorer (python3 score.py WORKDIR KEYDIR, absolute paths); pass = every check true and no ask/ files. Tools: Read/Write/Edit/Glob/Grep/Bash, web disabled. Single run, no retries. 1-min load average at scoring 0.24 (8 cores). Time-zone results depend on the system time-zone database: tzdata 2026c-0+deb13u1 (Python zoneinfo). Claude Code's own reported cost for claude-opus-5.5: $0.157652. Score: 5/5. Cost is an ESTIMATE: measured tokens x pricing.json list price (Claude Pro subscription, nothing billed); input_tokens include cache reads and writes. Single run.
Estimated cost List-price estimate; not actually billed.
Metrics
- Estimated cost
- $0.16
- Wall time
- 24s
- Human step-ins
- 0
- Turns
- 4
| Model | Input tok | Output tok | Cost |
|---|---|---|---|
| AClaude Opus 5.5anthropic/claude-opus-5.5effort default (no --effort flag) · thinking on | 84,295 | 2,456 | $0.16 |
Reproduce this run
- Use the use case prompt on the use case page.
- Same setup: Claude Opus 5.5 (anthropic/claude-opus-5.5, effort default (no --effort flag) · thinking on) via
Claude Code 2.1.299 (headless -p), cloud. - It counts as a success only if it meets every success criterion: affected_set advisory_ids priorities upgrade_targets patch_order
- Log model, tokens, wall time, human step-ins and the evidence log, then submit it as a reproduction. A different model? Submit a head-to-head rerun.
How runs are scored: Methodology.
Was this useful?
Automated checks
Trust 80% comes from these checks (how Trust % works).
- Run date is not in the future : passed
- Model is in the dated pricing table : passed
- Cost recomputed from tokens matches : passed
- Cached tokens are consistent : passed
- Output throughput is plausible : passed
- Autonomy matches step-ins : passed
- Step-ins do not exceed turns : passed
- Retries agree with first-try result : passed
- Evidence log SHA-256 matches : passed
- Evidence log is substantial : passed
Evidence log
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"result": "I wrote the patch plan to `out/patch_plan.json`. Seven of the 16 packages are affected. Here they are in patch order:\n\n| # | Package | Installed | Advisories | Priority | Upgrade to |\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n| 1 | dateparse2 | 3.6.13 | ADV-2026-1798 | 10.8 (8.8 + 2.0, exploited) | **null (no fix yet)** |\n| 2 | webhookr (direct) | 0.14.14 | ADV-2026-1824 | 7.5 | 0.14.18 |\n| 3 | zipstream (direct) | 1.14.17 | ADV-2026-1810 | 7.5 | 1.14.19 |\n| 4 | tinyorm (direct) | 3.0.11 | ADV-2026-1807 | 6.5 | 3.0.13 |\n| 5 | configo | 3.3.4 | ADV-2026-1801 | 6.5 | 3.3.7 |\n| 6 | markupx | 2.5.13 | ADV-2026-1792, ADV-2026-1793 | 6.3 (4.3 + 2.0, exploited) | 2.6.0 |\n| 7 | pdf_gen (direct) | 3.13.5 | ADV-2026-1787 | 6.1 | 3.13.8 |\n\nThings worth knowing about how the rules applied:\n- **dateparse2 is the top risk and can't be upgraded yet.** It's being exploited and its advisory has no fixed version.\n- **Ties:** webhookr and zipstream are both direct, so name order decides between them. tinyorm comes before configo because it's direct and configo is transitive.\n- **pdf_gen** is affected through the advisory listed under the name `Pdf.Gen`, which matches once names are normalised. Its other advisory, ADV-2026-1817, starts at 3.13.6, so the installed 3.13.5 isn't affected by it.\n- **markupx** gets 2.6.0, the higher of its two fixed versions.\n\nThese advisories don't count:\n- **Withdrawn:** ADV-2026-1772 (cryptbox).\n- **Wrong ecosystem:** ADV-2026-1778 is for npm, not pypi.\n- **Version outside the affected range:**\n - cryptbox 2.5.18 is just below the range of ADV-2026-1794, which starts at 2.5.19.\n - templo 3.2.0 is the fixed version itself.\n - xmlsafe 0.13.2 is newer than 0.9.0.",
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