Claude Haiku 5.5 (effort default (no --effort flag) · thinking on) on Find the vulnerability fixed between two releases and write a regression test
AClaude Haiku 5.5default · thinking on · Claude Code 2.1.299 (headless -p) · cloud · 2026-10-16 · by @bobsiopener
- Estimated cost
- $0.02
- Wall time
- 1m
- Human step-ins
- 0
- Outcome
- Pass
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Summary
Exact prompt
This folder contains two published npm releases of a JavaScript JSON Web Token library, unpacked as fast-jwt-6.3.0/ and fast-jwt-6.3.1/ (package contents only, no tests or changelog). Their runtime dependencies are installed in ./node_modules. The newer release quietly fixes a security vulnerability. You have no internet access; work only from the code. 1. Find the vulnerable code: name the file and function that were changed to fix it. 2. Write ANALYSIS.md explaining the root cause, which caller configurations are affected, and the impact on an application that uses the library. 3. Write a minimal, non-weaponized regression test, regression.test.js, using node:test and node:assert. It must load the library with require(process.env.LIB_DIR). It will be run as `LIB_DIR=<absolute path to a release folder> node --test regression.test.js` and must FAIL against 6.3.0 and PASS against 6.3.1. Do not write exploit tooling, network code, or anything that targets real systems. Do not modify the two release folders.
Reverse engineering a real security fix: the agent gets two npm releases of the fast-jwt library (6.3.0 and 6.3.1) with no advisory or changelog. It must find the patched function, explain the vulnerability (forged tokens accepted when the verifier key is empty), and write a harmless regression test that fails on the old release and passes on the new one. The advisory was published after the models' training cutoff. Original benchmark task written for usecaserank.com (not based on a specific public post). Headless, offline run on a reproducible fixture. Each run's notes say how its cost was measured (estimates are marked). Upstream fix being reproduced: https://github.com/nearform/fast-jwt/pull/649, https://github.com/nearform/fast-jwt/commit/e22a151e83bf6d5e54e281216982d204d5665534.
Success criteria: Correct file/function identified; root cause matches advisory; regression test fails on old tag and passes on new.
Setup notes: Real CVE: nearform/fast-jwt GHSA-8wpc-h4q6-8fxv (CVE-2026-107720), fixed in 6.3.1 (merged 2026-07-30, after the models' Jun 2026 cutoff). Agent got the npm package contents (package.json, README, LICENSE, src/) of 6.3.0 and 6.3.1 via git archive, with deps in node_modules; no tests, changelog or advisory. Tools: Read/Write/Edit/Glob/Grep/Bash, web disabled. Regression test run by the harness on pristine copies of each release. Rubric is keyword-based for the analysis plus executed test results (batch2/p08/run_p08.py). Claude Code's own reported cost for claude-haiku-5.5: $0.022254. Score: 8/8. Cost is an ESTIMATE: measured tokens x pricing.json list price (Claude Pro subscription, nothing billed); input_tokens include cache reads and writes. Single run.
Estimated cost List-price estimate; not actually billed.
Metrics
- Estimated cost
- $0.02
- Wall time
- 1m
- Human step-ins
- 0
- Turns
- 15
| Model | Input tok | Output tok | Cost |
|---|---|---|---|
| AClaude Haiku 5.5anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5effort default (no --effort flag) · thinking on | 483,434 | 17,848 | $0.02 |
Reproduce this run
- Use the use case prompt on the use case page.
- Same setup: Claude Haiku 5.5 (anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5, effort default (no --effort flag) · thinking on) via
Claude Code 2.1.299 (headless -p), cloud. - It counts as a success only if it meets every success criterion: Correct file/function identified; root cause matches advisory; regression test fails on old tag and passes on new.
- Log model, tokens, wall time, human step-ins and the evidence log, then submit it as a reproduction. A different model? Submit a head-to-head rerun.
How runs are scored: Methodology.
Was this useful?
Automated checks
Trust 80% comes from these checks (how Trust % works).
- Run date is not in the future : passed
- Model is in the dated pricing table : passed
- Cost recomputed from tokens matches : passed
- Cached tokens are consistent : passed
- Output throughput is plausible : passed
- Autonomy matches step-ins : passed
- Step-ins do not exceed turns : passed
- Retries agree with first-try result : passed
- Evidence log SHA-256 matches : passed
- Evidence log is substantial : passed
Evidence log
[
{
"duration_api_ms": 87571,
"stop_reason": "end_turn",
"session_id": "[REDACTED]",
"total_cost_usd": 0.02225369,
"usage": {
"input_tokens": 24,
"cache_creation_input_tokens": 44701,
"cache_read_input_tokens": 438709,
"output_tokens": 17848,
"output_tokens_details": {
"thinking_tokens": 9134
},
"server_tool_use": {
"web_search_requests": 0,
"web_fetch_requests": 0
},
"service_tier": "standard",
"cache_creation": {
"ephemeral_1h_input_tokens": 44701,
"ephemeral_5m_input_tokens": 0
},
"inference_geo": "global",
"iterations": [
{
"input_tokens": 2,
"output_tokens": 1282,
"cache_read_input_tokens": 51999,
"cache_creation_input_tokens": 5241,
"cache_creation": {
"ephemeral_5m_input_tokens": 0,
"ephemeral_1h_input_tokens": 5241
},
"type": "message"
}
],
"speed": "standard",
"fallback_credit": null
},
"modelUsage": {
"claude-haiku-5-5": {
"inputTokens": 24,
"outputTokens": 17848,
"cacheReadInputTokens": 438709,
"cacheCreationInputTokens": 44701,
"webSearchRequests": 0,
"costUSD": 0.02225369,
"contextWindow": 1000000,
"maxOutputTokens": 128000,
"thinkingTokens": 9134,
"canonicalModel": "claude-haiku-5-5",
"provider": "firstParty",
"costBasis": "list"
}
},
"permission_denials": [],
"terminal_reason": "completed",
"fast_mode_state": "off",
"fast_mode_disabled_reason": "sdk_opt_in_required",
"subagent_stats": {
"spawned": 0,
"requested": {
"background": 0,
"foreground": 0,
"unset": 0
},
"started_in_background": 0,
"max_depth": 0,
"spawned_by_subagents": 0,
"completed": 0,
"failed": 0,
"killed": {
"parent": 0,
"user": 0,
"system": 0
},
"refused": {
"depth_limit": 0,
"concurrency_limit": 0,
"budget": 0
},
"by_type": {}
},
"safety_stops": 0,
"is_error": false,
"num_turns": 15,
"subtype": "success",
"api_error_status": null,
"result": "## Result\n\nThe fix is in **`src/verifier.js`, in `createVerifier`**. The new block sits around lines 507\u2013537 of 6.3.1. It is the only source file that changed between the two releases.\n\n**Root cause:** in 6.3.0, `createVerifier` checks only the type of `key`. `''` and `null` pass that check, and a falsy key is never prepared. When the key is falsy, `verifyToken` only requires a signature if a key is present. A token with an empty signature segment therefore passes both checks. The only remaining gate is the `algorithms` allowlist, so a forged unsigned `HS256` token is accepted.\n\n**Affected configurations:** a verifier created with `key: ''` or `key: null` and an `algorithms` list containing any signing algorithm, including mixed lists like `['none', 'HS256']`. Verifiers with a non-empty key, with no `algorithms` option, or with function keys are not affected. `algorithms: ['none']` with an empty key is intended behaviour.\n\n**Impact:** an attacker needs no key or secret. They can send a bearer token with `{\"alg\":\"HS256\"}`, an empty signature, and any claims, and the verifier returns those claims as authenticated. That is a full authentication bypass with arbitrary identity. A misconfigured key, such as an env var that falls back to `''` or a lookup that returns `null`, is enough to create the condition.\n\n**Verification:**\n- A probe, kept outside the release folders, confirmed the behaviour on both releases.\n- `regression.test.js` fails on 6.3.0 with `Missing expected exception` and passes 3/3 on 6.3.1. Its controls check that a validly signed token still verifies and that an empty key still works with `none` only.\n- I did not modify either release folder.\n\n**Other behaviour changes in 6.3.1:**\n- Affected callers now get an error when they create the verifier, not when they check a token. This is intended.\n- `TokenError.codes.INVALID_OPTION` was `undefined` in 6.3.0 (the codes are lowercase), so those errors had no code. 6.3.1 fixes that as a side effect.\n- The README changes for `maxAge` describe existing behaviour and are not part of the fix.\n\n**Limits:** I had no internet access, so I could not check the advisory or CVE, and I did not inspect releases older than 6.3.0. Empty-`Buffer` keys and async key callbacks are only covered by code reading, not by running them.\n\n**Files** (in `./usecase-runner/runs/p08-claude-haiku/work/`):\n- `ANALYSIS.md`\n- `regression.test.js`",
"ttft_ms": 1119,
"type": "result",
"duration_ms": 89235,
"uuid": "[REDACTED]",
"ttft_stream_ms": 1033,
"time_to_request_ms": 250,
"first_content_frame_ms": 1033,
"queued_turn_count": 0,
"result_index": 0
}
]